Husband E. Kimmel

This message was decoded by Navy code breakers ahead of the Pearl Harbor attack and before it went through formal Japanese-U.S. diplomatic channels. It indicates that Japan has concluded "that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations" and while not a declaration of war, portends the attack on Pearl Harbor.

This magazine article provides a detailed account of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and its immediate aftermath. It describes the unpreparedness of the U.S. Navy, which suffered significant losses, and the initial shock and disbelief among American leaders and citizens. The article also discusses the broader implications for U.S. involvement in World War II, highlighting the shift from isolationism to active engagement in the conflict.

This letter provides insight to Kimmel's reaction to the public outcry against him after Pearl Harbor.

Kimmel's lengthy and detailed statement covers everything from the threat of attack to the inadequate defenses of Pearl Harbor to the attack itself. It also includes the hearings before the Roberts Commission, a presidentially mandated inquiry into Pearl Harbor.

The telephone conversation details the damage done by the Japanese to the American fleet at Pearl Harbor. Admiral Block indicates that he did not know what actions Admiral Kimmel had taken.

This US Navy secret document reports damage sustained by ships of the Pacific Fleet resulting from the Japanese attacks on December 7, 1941.

In this document, Kimmel argues that the failure to defend Pearl Harbor adequately was due to leaders in Washington withholding crucial information from the Hawaiian Commanders, not due to any lack of cooperation between the Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor.

This is the report of the commission appointed by the U.S. President to investigate and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor. 

This document, from 9 months before the Pearl Harbor attack, describes actions the US Army and Navy would take in case of sudden hostile action by Japan (code named Orange in this document) against Oahu or US Fleet Units in the Hawaiian area.

This statement was read before the Naval Court of Inquiry Investigating the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor. Kimmel outlines his defense against accusations related to the Pearl Harbor attack. He emphasizes that he was not provided with crucial intelligence that indicated an imminent Japanese attack, which was available to high-level officials in Washington. Kimmel argues that the lack of timely and accurate information significantly impacted his ability to prepare for and prevent the attack.

Flynn asserts that the true responsibility for the Pearl Harbor attack lies primarily with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, rather than the military commanders who were officially blamed. Flynn argues that Roosevelt's decisions to keep the fleet in Pearl Harbor and to strip its defenses, along with his desire to provoke Japan into attacking, were major blunders that led to the disaster.

In this letter Kimmel argues against the refusal to publish the findings of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry. He expresses his frustration at not being able to publicly clear his record and criticizes the secrecy surrounding the proceedings.

These notes outline the approach Admiral Kimmel would have taken during his court-martial, which he expected would vindicate him of any charges of negligence for the events at Pearl Harbor. Kimmel was eventually denied the right to a court-martial.

In the interrogation, Fuchida discusses the attack on Pearl Harbor, in which he was the senior officer of the Japanese attack group.

In the interrogation, Watanabe provided insight into the training the Japanese military conducted in advance of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

In this speech delivered over the radio, Maas criticizes the Roosevelt administration for withholding crucial information about plans for the Pearl Harbor attack, which he argues was known in advance by top officials. Maas claims that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were unfairly blamed and denied a court-martial, as doing so would reveal the administration's failures. He asserts that the refusal to disclose the full truth about Pearl Harbor is politically motivated.

The report discusses the strategic and operational plans of the Japanese Navy leading up to and including the attack on Pearl Harbor. It details logistical challenges the Japanese experienced, such as fuel shortages and emergency measures, as well as the importance of surprise and timing in the execution of their operations.

This article reflects on the intelligence failures and misunderstandings that led to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Despite numerous warnings and clues about Japanese intentions, the U.S. military underestimated Japan's capabilities and failed to prepare adequately. The author critiques the lack of unified command and coordination between the Army and Navy, which contributed significantly to the disaster.

This one page document covers communication Kimmel received from the U.S. Navy that led to his request for retirement following Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Husband states that he believes that information was withheld from him by the Navy Department under the direction of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and that the absence of that information led to the  surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

In this article, Kittredge, a Naval historian, analyzes the military and political situation leading up to Pearl Harbor. He concludes that high government officials, including the President, made every possible effort to avert war with Japan and that the Army and Navy failed to institute measures to detect an approaching hostile force.

U.S. Representative Lawrence H. Smith enters into the congressional record an article from Shipmate magazine, vidicating Admiral Husband E. Kimmel for the Pearl Harbor attack.

The resolution declares support for Admiral Husband E. Kimmel "for his sincere and dedicated performance of duty and for carrying until his death the unfortunate burden and stigma associated with the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor."

This senate press release, accompanied by a letter to the U.S. president and a description of Section 582 of the FY2000 Defense Authorization Bill, explains the scapegoating of Kimmel and Short following Pearl Harbor and concludes that both officers performed their duties competently and should have their wartime ranks restored.